Case: Adjourned Aero Nox v. Ministry of State (2026) CV 14
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Opening Statement
Your Honour,
On January 27th of this year, Plaintiff received, as a Member of Parliament, a query from the Minister of State to perform a Parliamentary audit. Plaintiff was taken aback by this query and asked the Minister to clarify which Act of Parliament gave them the authority to perform Parliamentary audits. The Minister's response? "The fact that I'm MoS minister?" Given his response was a question, it seems the Minister wasn't sure himself whether he possessed the Constitutional authority to perform Parliamentary audits. He later added that "It's been in the ministry policies for month[...]."
Nowhere in our body of law is the Ministry of State granted the ability to perform Parliamentary audits. Nowhere in our body of law is the Executive granted the ability to perform Parliamentary audits. Now, the Defense argues that while Parliamentary audits are no specified, the Ministry of State does have general auditing, surveying, and oversight powers. Let's review, for a moment, Section 11 of the Governing Structure Act:
As we can see here, there is absolutely no mention of the Ministry of State having the power to audit anything, let alone Parliament. So, we have to ask. From where does the Defense's assertion come? Could it be from the Open Governance Act? Surely that can't be since Section 1.a of that Act clearly states that "The Ministry of State shall conduct monthly audits of all Ministries to evaluate internal operations, workplace environments, and ministerial performance." This Act only grants to Ministry of State to audit Ministries, not Parliament.
Where does this leave us? With the Defense's claim that Ministries are empowered to create and manage their own programs. Which brings us to the crux of our issue and the legal questions at hand.
Does the Executive possess the right to grant itself responsibilities not defined in law?
To answer this question, we must look to the Constitution.
Article 2 of the Constitution lays out four facts of value to our legal question:
1. There are three distinct and co-equal branches of government.
2. The Parliament shall have the authority to makes laws.
3. The Executive shall have the authority to execute the law.
4. The Executive derives its power directly from the Parliament.
Here, Article 4 of the Constitution states that Cabinet Portfolios may be established through law and that the person appointed to head a portfolio shall hole the title of Minister of (Portfolio's name).
So let's put it all together.
The Minister of State is a person appointed to head the State portfolio. The State portfolio is established in the Governing Structure Act which does not include any mention of Parliamentary audits. In fact, Parliamentary audits are not defined anywhere in our body of law. The Minister of State is part of the Executive, and thus derives his power directly from the Parliament. The Minister, as a member of the Executive, only has the authority to execute the law.
So we ask again. Does the Executive possess the right to grant itself responsibilities not defined in law? The answer is clearly no. The Constitution only grants the Executive the authority to execute the law. By asserting the ability to give itself responsibilities not defined in law, the Executive is usurping the Parliament's Constitutional authority. They are blatantly making a power grab and threatening the balance of our three co-equal branches of government.
Today, we respectfully ask this Court to intervene. We seek the immediate cessation of all activities by the Ministry of State, and the Executive, that are not defined by law, particularly these unconstitutional Parliamentary audits. We trust that you will find our arguments compelling and grant any further relief that the Court deems just and proper.
Thank you, Your Honour.
Your Honour,
On January 27th of this year, Plaintiff received, as a Member of Parliament, a query from the Minister of State to perform a Parliamentary audit. Plaintiff was taken aback by this query and asked the Minister to clarify which Act of Parliament gave them the authority to perform Parliamentary audits. The Minister's response? "The fact that I'm MoS minister?" Given his response was a question, it seems the Minister wasn't sure himself whether he possessed the Constitutional authority to perform Parliamentary audits. He later added that "It's been in the ministry policies for month[...]."
Nowhere in our body of law is the Ministry of State granted the ability to perform Parliamentary audits. Nowhere in our body of law is the Executive granted the ability to perform Parliamentary audits. Now, the Defense argues that while Parliamentary audits are no specified, the Ministry of State does have general auditing, surveying, and oversight powers. Let's review, for a moment, Section 11 of the Governing Structure Act:
As we can see here, there is absolutely no mention of the Ministry of State having the power to audit anything, let alone Parliament. So, we have to ask. From where does the Defense's assertion come? Could it be from the Open Governance Act? Surely that can't be since Section 1.a of that Act clearly states that "The Ministry of State shall conduct monthly audits of all Ministries to evaluate internal operations, workplace environments, and ministerial performance." This Act only grants to Ministry of State to audit Ministries, not Parliament.
Where does this leave us? With the Defense's claim that Ministries are empowered to create and manage their own programs. Which brings us to the crux of our issue and the legal questions at hand.
Does the Executive possess the right to grant itself responsibilities not defined in law?
To answer this question, we must look to the Constitution.
Article 2 of the Constitution lays out four facts of value to our legal question:
1. There are three distinct and co-equal branches of government.
2. The Parliament shall have the authority to makes laws.
3. The Executive shall have the authority to execute the law.
4. The Executive derives its power directly from the Parliament.
Here, Article 4 of the Constitution states that Cabinet Portfolios may be established through law and that the person appointed to head a portfolio shall hole the title of Minister of (Portfolio's name).
So let's put it all together.
The Minister of State is a person appointed to head the State portfolio. The State portfolio is established in the Governing Structure Act which does not include any mention of Parliamentary audits. In fact, Parliamentary audits are not defined anywhere in our body of law. The Minister of State is part of the Executive, and thus derives his power directly from the Parliament. The Minister, as a member of the Executive, only has the authority to execute the law.
So we ask again. Does the Executive possess the right to grant itself responsibilities not defined in law? The answer is clearly no. The Constitution only grants the Executive the authority to execute the law. By asserting the ability to give itself responsibilities not defined in law, the Executive is usurping the Parliament's Constitutional authority. They are blatantly making a power grab and threatening the balance of our three co-equal branches of government.
Today, we respectfully ask this Court to intervene. We seek the immediate cessation of all activities by the Ministry of State, and the Executive, that are not defined by law, particularly these unconstitutional Parliamentary audits. We trust that you will find our arguments compelling and grant any further relief that the Court deems just and proper.
Thank you, Your Honour.
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Your Honor, the Ministry of State has committed no wrongdoing here, as we will show.
This is a voluntary audit program. The Ministry of State has regularly included Parliament in this program in the interest of greater governmental transparency and feedback. No Member of Parliament has ever been punished for not participating. No injury or harm has been committed.
Plaintiff claims executive overreach, because a Ministry is asking Members of Parliament voluntary questions that the MPs can ignore without consequences. Voluntary surveys of the legislature is not a separation of powers issue, when Plaintiff could have chosen not to respond, without punishment.
To respond more directly to claims Plaintiff made: the Ministries make up the vast majority of the Azalea Isles Government. It is not exaggeration or inappropriate to say that the Ministry of State has general oversight powers, when it is responsible for overseeing most of the Azalean Government, just as it is not exaggeration to say the Prime Minister leads the Executive branch, despite agencies like the Bank of Azalea existing and not being directly subject to the Prime Minister's control as Ministries are.
The Members of Parliament are paid for the work they do, and the Ministry of State has a voluntary policy to allow them to include their achievements or concerns in the Ministry's audit reporting, to be put in with the rest of the responses garnered from individuals paid by the government. It also allows them to ignore the Ministry altogether and choose not to participate.
The Defendant is not legislating from the Executive branch, or disregarding Parliamentary limits. The Defendant has an optional way for Members of Parliament to submit responses to an existing program that fulfills legislative requirements, without penalty. There is no usurping of parliamentary authority or violation of the law, and Plaintiff's narrow lens does not make sense in this application.
This program yields the Executive branch no additional power while usurping no power of another branch or agency, gives MPs a voluntary opportunity to participate, and inflicts no punishment. The Plaintiff does not accuse the Defendant of giving itself unlawful enforcement powers, either. It is not our belief, Your Honor, that such an optional program, aligning with broader Ministry responsibilities per the Open Governance Act and without any ability to inflict harm, trespasses the separation of powers.
Thank you.
This is a voluntary audit program. The Ministry of State has regularly included Parliament in this program in the interest of greater governmental transparency and feedback. No Member of Parliament has ever been punished for not participating. No injury or harm has been committed.
Plaintiff claims executive overreach, because a Ministry is asking Members of Parliament voluntary questions that the MPs can ignore without consequences. Voluntary surveys of the legislature is not a separation of powers issue, when Plaintiff could have chosen not to respond, without punishment.
To respond more directly to claims Plaintiff made: the Ministries make up the vast majority of the Azalea Isles Government. It is not exaggeration or inappropriate to say that the Ministry of State has general oversight powers, when it is responsible for overseeing most of the Azalean Government, just as it is not exaggeration to say the Prime Minister leads the Executive branch, despite agencies like the Bank of Azalea existing and not being directly subject to the Prime Minister's control as Ministries are.
The Members of Parliament are paid for the work they do, and the Ministry of State has a voluntary policy to allow them to include their achievements or concerns in the Ministry's audit reporting, to be put in with the rest of the responses garnered from individuals paid by the government. It also allows them to ignore the Ministry altogether and choose not to participate.
The Defendant is not legislating from the Executive branch, or disregarding Parliamentary limits. The Defendant has an optional way for Members of Parliament to submit responses to an existing program that fulfills legislative requirements, without penalty. There is no usurping of parliamentary authority or violation of the law, and Plaintiff's narrow lens does not make sense in this application.
This program yields the Executive branch no additional power while usurping no power of another branch or agency, gives MPs a voluntary opportunity to participate, and inflicts no punishment. The Plaintiff does not accuse the Defendant of giving itself unlawful enforcement powers, either. It is not our belief, Your Honor, that such an optional program, aligning with broader Ministry responsibilities per the Open Governance Act and without any ability to inflict harm, trespasses the separation of powers.
Thank you.
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We will now proceed to the next stage of the trial. Both parties are asked to provide a list of witnesses they wish to call or to indicate they do not intend to call any witnesses within the next 48 hours.
Please be advised of court fees that may be associated with calling a witness.
Please be advised of court fees that may be associated with calling a witness.
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The Defense does not intend to call any witnesses.
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Closing Statement
Your Honour,
I've shown that the Constitution and the Governing Structure Act do not grant the Ministry of State the authority to perform Parliamentary audits. I've also shown how the Constitution clearly states that the authority to legislate lies exclusively with the Parliament. Furthermore, I've shown how the Constitution clearly states that the Executive only possesses the ability to execute the law and that they derive their power directly from the Parliament.
The Defense claims the Ministry of State has the authority to perform Parliamentary audits because of their own policies. Those policies are not laws. By claiming that their policies give them the authority to perform Parliamentary audits, they also claim the right to legislate. Since a policy would hold the same weight as a law. The Constitution clearly does not allow for that, so the claim fails. If the claim fails, then performing Parliamentary audits is an illegal act.
Now, the Defense also claims that this act is not illegal because it is voluntary. This claim is ridiculous on its face. An illegal act does not become legal just because it is voluntary to those it is acted upon. The Ministry of State simply does not possess the authority to perform Parliamentary audits, regardless of how voluntary they may be.
The Defense also claims that no injury or harm has been committed. This claim also fails since, in its execution of an illegal act, the Ministry is State is using resources paid for by our taxpayers.
The facts remain. Parliamentary audits are not defined in law. Their execution by the Ministry of State is an illegal act. And their claim that their policies give them the authority to perform them is the same as claiming that their policies are equal to the law. Policies written by the Execute, not Parliament. How else can we interpret this? Other than the Executive attempting to usurp the Parliament's Constitutional authority. A gross overreach of powers by the Executive.
Your Honour,
I've shown that the Constitution and the Governing Structure Act do not grant the Ministry of State the authority to perform Parliamentary audits. I've also shown how the Constitution clearly states that the authority to legislate lies exclusively with the Parliament. Furthermore, I've shown how the Constitution clearly states that the Executive only possesses the ability to execute the law and that they derive their power directly from the Parliament.
The Defense claims the Ministry of State has the authority to perform Parliamentary audits because of their own policies. Those policies are not laws. By claiming that their policies give them the authority to perform Parliamentary audits, they also claim the right to legislate. Since a policy would hold the same weight as a law. The Constitution clearly does not allow for that, so the claim fails. If the claim fails, then performing Parliamentary audits is an illegal act.
Now, the Defense also claims that this act is not illegal because it is voluntary. This claim is ridiculous on its face. An illegal act does not become legal just because it is voluntary to those it is acted upon. The Ministry of State simply does not possess the authority to perform Parliamentary audits, regardless of how voluntary they may be.
The Defense also claims that no injury or harm has been committed. This claim also fails since, in its execution of an illegal act, the Ministry is State is using resources paid for by our taxpayers.
The facts remain. Parliamentary audits are not defined in law. Their execution by the Ministry of State is an illegal act. And their claim that their policies give them the authority to perform them is the same as claiming that their policies are equal to the law. Policies written by the Execute, not Parliament. How else can we interpret this? Other than the Executive attempting to usurp the Parliament's Constitutional authority. A gross overreach of powers by the Executive.
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The Defendant has 48 hours to present a closing statement. @xXLordLyonXx
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Unfortunately, Your Honor, I am requesting a 48 hour extension due to my work schedule. I will attempt to deliver the closing statement sooner, but I have been busy and had to work late the last two days, and have not had the proper time left to cement a closing statement for the court.
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Given consideration of your circumstances, the extension is accepted. You have an additional 48 hours to provide a closing statement.
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Closing Statement
Your Honor, Plaintiff has referenced the laws and the Constitution extensively, but these references are without proper context or understanding.
It is true the Executive branch executes the law. Executing the law comes with some amount of discretion in its application. The law criminalizes Murder, and the Ministry of Justice has a policy allowing individuals to claim self defense prior to jailing them. That is not a legal requirement*, but the Ministry has that policy to better enforce criminal charges. The Open Governance Act, which explicitly grants the Ministry of State the power to audit ministries, expressly claims transparency and strengthening the government-citizen bond as its purpose.
*The Defense recognizes recent legislation is in the process of changing this, but the policy predates any law taking effect.
The purpose of the Ministry of State’s audit program is to increase transparency in the Government, again, as stated in the bill. The Ministry of State includes optional questions to Members of Parliament that enhance this overarching goal and carry no penalty or consequence. Asking Members of Parliament voluntary questions so their answers can be included in a government transparency audit is not forbidden or contradicted by law, and fails to infringe on individual rights. Plaintiff’s case for harm is the theoretical usage of taxpayer resources, of which no evidence has been provided to the Court.
Furthermore, Plaintiff claims Ministries cannot have their own policies. Plaintiff’s claims directly contravene the Governing Structure Act, 4a - “Ministers are empowered to establish programs and policies necessary to fulfill the responsibilities of their ministries.” Voluntary parliamentary questionnaires clearly help fulfill the legislative intent of the Open Governance Act, bringing more transparency and information to the public. This policy was not brought onto the forums previously due to its nonbinding nature, unlike Ministry of Economic Affairs tender policies or Ministry of Justice policing policies, but this was corrected.
The Ministry of State’s policy of asking Members of Parliament questions, to publish alongside its legally required audits, does not violate the law. It is not a violation of the Constitution; the Ministry is not engaging in legislative action, but is simply attempting to provide greater public transparency in line with a goal of the Open Governance Act audits. Ministries are empowered to create these policies by the very Act the Plaintiff quotes.
The Defense is not arguing Executive policies replace or overwrite the law; they complement what exists, to outline how the Ministry is handling its responsibilities, in accordance with the law. Plaintiff’s concern about the Executive branch usurping Parliamentary power is undercut by Parliament’s choice to delegate this ability to the Executive branch. The Executive branch cannot be usurping an ability Parliament delegated to them, Your Honor.
Your Honor, Plaintiff has referenced the laws and the Constitution extensively, but these references are without proper context or understanding.
It is true the Executive branch executes the law. Executing the law comes with some amount of discretion in its application. The law criminalizes Murder, and the Ministry of Justice has a policy allowing individuals to claim self defense prior to jailing them. That is not a legal requirement*, but the Ministry has that policy to better enforce criminal charges. The Open Governance Act, which explicitly grants the Ministry of State the power to audit ministries, expressly claims transparency and strengthening the government-citizen bond as its purpose.
*The Defense recognizes recent legislation is in the process of changing this, but the policy predates any law taking effect.
The purpose of the Ministry of State’s audit program is to increase transparency in the Government, again, as stated in the bill. The Ministry of State includes optional questions to Members of Parliament that enhance this overarching goal and carry no penalty or consequence. Asking Members of Parliament voluntary questions so their answers can be included in a government transparency audit is not forbidden or contradicted by law, and fails to infringe on individual rights. Plaintiff’s case for harm is the theoretical usage of taxpayer resources, of which no evidence has been provided to the Court.
Furthermore, Plaintiff claims Ministries cannot have their own policies. Plaintiff’s claims directly contravene the Governing Structure Act, 4a - “Ministers are empowered to establish programs and policies necessary to fulfill the responsibilities of their ministries.” Voluntary parliamentary questionnaires clearly help fulfill the legislative intent of the Open Governance Act, bringing more transparency and information to the public. This policy was not brought onto the forums previously due to its nonbinding nature, unlike Ministry of Economic Affairs tender policies or Ministry of Justice policing policies, but this was corrected.
The Ministry of State’s policy of asking Members of Parliament questions, to publish alongside its legally required audits, does not violate the law. It is not a violation of the Constitution; the Ministry is not engaging in legislative action, but is simply attempting to provide greater public transparency in line with a goal of the Open Governance Act audits. Ministries are empowered to create these policies by the very Act the Plaintiff quotes.
The Defense is not arguing Executive policies replace or overwrite the law; they complement what exists, to outline how the Ministry is handling its responsibilities, in accordance with the law. Plaintiff’s concern about the Executive branch usurping Parliamentary power is undercut by Parliament’s choice to delegate this ability to the Executive branch. The Executive branch cannot be usurping an ability Parliament delegated to them, Your Honor.
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Court VerdictAzalea Isles District Court, Civil Case (CV)
Case No. CV-26-14Aero Nox (Aeronox4) v. Ministry of State
Position of the Plaintiff
1. The Plaintiff, Aero Nox, alleges that the Ministry of State acted outside its constitutional and statutory authority by initiating and conducting what it termed "Parliamentary Audits" of Members of Parliament. The Plaintiff argues that neither the Constitution nor the Governing Structure Act grants the executive branch the authority to audit legislators.
2. The Plaintiff contends that the executive branch derives its authority solely from laws enacted by Parliament, and that permitting the Ministry of State to conduct parliamentary audits (even if voluntary) constitutes an improper exercise of executive power and an intrusion into co-equal powers. Additionally, the Plaintiff makes an argument regarding the use of government resources ("waste of funds") to conduct these audits.
3. The Plaintiff argues that executive policies cannot substitute for statutory authorization, and that allowing such audits risks undermining the separation of powers by enabling the executive to evaluate or oversee legislators without legislative approval.
Position of the Defendant
1. The Defendant, the Ministry of State, argues that the questioned program is voluntary in nature and consists of optional questions posed to Members of Parliament in furtherance of governmental transparency, pointing to the Open Governance Act based on an argument of legislative intent. The Defendant asserts that no Member of Parliament is compelled to respond and no consequences arise from refusal.
2. The Defendant contends that ministries are statutorily empowered to establish programs and policies necessary to fulfill their responsibilities. It is argued that voluntary questionnaires align with broader transparency goals and fall within permissible executive discretion. The Defendant points to examples in the Ministry of Justice to support their point.
3. The Defendant maintains that because participation is optional and no enforcement authority is asserted, the program does not constitute executive overreach or a violation of separation-of-powers principles.
Court Opinion
First of all, an important issue here is to ensure that the Plaintiff has established sufficient standing in this case against alleged government overreach. As established in cases like Vontobel v. Ministry of Urban Development (2025) CV 07 and Anthony Org v. Azalea Isles (2026) CV 15, a plaintiff must demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury as a result of this government again. Evaluating this case, the Court believes that sufficient standing has been provided, given that the Plaintiff, Aero Nox, was serving as a Member of Parliament directly impacted by this ministry policy. Public audit reports, announced by a figure of authority to the public, present as a perceived objective measurement of Nox's performance as a Member of Parliament.
In this case, the legislation that has been the main point of contention is the Governing Structure Act, which authorizes ministries to create policies as long as they are "subject to the laws and the Constitution of the Azalea Isles and cannot contravene them." Therefore, a major consideration here is the Constitution, and the Court seeks to offer a clear interpretation of the Constitution with regards to the separation of powers in its decision.
After much consideration, the Court hereby publishes the following key points in its opinion:
1. The Court recognizes the the executive possesses implied authority to create administrative programs and policies necessary to execute the law. The Constitution acknowledges this by noting that branches retain the "quasi ability" to fulfill obligations necessary for the performance of laws (Article 2). Therefore, not every executive action requires explicit statutory enumeration.
2. However, the Court also believes that a clear distinction between the role of executive power and legislative power is specified in the Constitution, asserting them as "co-equal branches" in which the executive derives its authority to execute law from the legislative branch (Article 2). An "audit," by its ordinary meaning, constitutes a formal evaluative or oversight function conducted under governmental authority. When undertaken by the executive with respect to Members of Parliament and incorporated into official reporting, such an audit carries structural implications beyond mere voluntary communication.
3. Even where participation is optional, the formal characterization of executive evaluation of legislators risks altering the balance between branches. Any time an executive ministry initiates an inquiry under the assertion of governmental authority, such action carries an inherent coercive effect. It is not a an informal survey or questionnaire, it is a direct audit of elected Members of Parliament reported on by an authority. The Constitution does not authorize the executive to exercise oversight authority over Parliament absent legislative enactment. Such authority, if intended, must originate from Parliament itself.
Decision
The Azalea Isles District Court hereby rules in favour of the Plaintiff, granting the following relief:
1. The Ministry of State shall not be permitted to conduct or publish formal executive audits of Members of Parliament absent explicit statutory authorization. While all audits that have already been published may remain, the Defendant is hereby ordered to amend MOS Audit Policy in order to comply with these standards moving forward.
The Court would like to also stress, however, that this ruling is intentionally narrow. It does not prohibit voluntary inter-branch dialogue, informal surveys, or transparency initiatives that do not purport to audit or evaluate Members of Parliament under executive authority. It is confined solely to the conduct or publication of formal executive audits of legislators without statutory authorization.This trial is hereby adjourned. The Court thanks both parties for their time.
Signed,Hon. Justice Raymond West