- Joined
- Jun 30, 2024
- Messages
- 105
- Thread Author
- #1
Author: Lysander Lyon, MP
Sponsor: N/A
Type: Act of Parliament
1. Short Title
(a) This bill shall be referred to as the "Fair Competition Act".
(b) This bill was authored by Lysander Lyon.
2. Market Disruption
(a) Market Consolidation shall be defined as intentional consolidation of market share in a given market by an entity, in such manner as to restrict consumer choice and market competition, where the result either leads to immediately visible higher costs for the consumer or a significant restriction of choice, in an active market.
(i) For example, in an Azalea where there are three major diamond sellers (A, B, and C) selling at $4 per, $2.5 per, and $1.5 per respectively, Company A acquiring Company C would be problematic due to the expected price increase.
(ii) Similarly, even if Company A also priced its diamonds at $1.5, if Company A and Company C together would make up a vast majority (IE 80%) of the diamond market, this could also be problematic, assuming diamonds are frequently traded. If there are few diamond purchases in general, this would no longer hold as an issue.
(b) Market Manipulation shall be defined as the intentional and unnatural manipulation of market forces for the gain of oneself or others.
(i) For example, naturally increasing diamond sale prices due to demand is an acceptable response to market forces. Discussing with other diamond suppliers and agreeing to all raise diamond sale prices is not.
(c) Hostile Monopolization shall be defined as an entity’s monopolization or near-monopolization of a market or industry, which has resulted in measurably poor outcomes for participants in that market or industry.
(i) Monopolization refers to situations where an entity either is the sole supplier or demander of a specific good, or has amassed a vast majority of the market share.
(ii) This section specifically clarifies and applies to hostile monopolies; that is, monopolies that are causing market participants unnecessary harm. There being only one farming company because only a few people wish to farm, is not inherently hostile monopolization or market consolidation. If that farming company is dramatically overcharging, with high prices not related to demand, that would be hostile monopolization.
(iii) This does not apply to patents granted for international research.
3. Azalea Isles Trade Commission
(a) This bill establishes the Azalea Isles Trade Commission (AITC), which shall have its own Discord to operate out of.
(b) There shall be one Commissioner of the AITC, nominated by the Prime Minister and confirmed by Parliament. The Commissioner shall serve in their position indefinitely, until such time as they either resign or are removed through a majority vote of Parliament.
(c) The Commissioner shall be responsible for running the AITC, including hiring employees where needed, and submitting budget requests to the Ministry of State, to be forwarded to the Prime Minister and Parliament.
4. Competition Governance
(a) Actions of market disruption, as outlined in Section 2, may be reported to the AITC for evaluation.
(i) Individuals may request their name be kept fully anonymous, and the Commission must comply with this request if it is made.
(b) The AITC shall evaluate the report, and may request reasonable documentation from companies under investigation to come to its conclusion.
(i) This shall mandatorily include a response from the company or companies at some point in the case before a conclusion is reached, addressing the allegation. For example, if the report is over an acquisition being market consolidation, this response will allow the company/companies to explain why the acquisition is not large enough to be restricting choice, why the market is not active enough to warrant intervention, why it will not raise prices, etc.
(c) The AITC shall be empowered to levy fines, block acquisitions, reverse acquisitions, and negotiate contractual agreements in the course of preventing and enforcing against market disruptions. The Commission shall adhere to the following structure while doing so:
(i) For relatively minor cases, where harm is estimated to be fairly small (under $50,000), the Commission may handle the cases as it feels fit, with the exception of the requirement outlined in 4c(iv).
(ii) For moderate cases, where harm is estimated to be between $50,000 and $150,000, the Commission shall provide the Cabinet with a copy of its findings, and propose its solution. The proposed solution must pass a majority vote of the sitting Cabinet members.
(iii) For large cases, where harm is estimated to be greater than $150,000, the Commission shall provide Parliament with a copy of its findings, and its proposed solution. The solution must pass a majority vote of the sitting Members of Parliament.
(iv) All contracts, regardless of the size of the case, must receive approval by a majority vote of Parliament before they can be binding. The Commission may not sign or approve a contract without this majority approval, which shall be proposed for no shorter than 24 hours of debate and 24 hours of voting, subject to all other parliamentary procedure.
(v) Harm shall be estimated based on actual harm and reasonable potential harm to the consumer and the market, over a reasonable timeframe decided by the Commission that should be no shorter than three months and no longer than six. This decided timeframe must be reasonable, and the logic in deciding a timeframe should apply across reports, such that bias does not occur.
(d) The AITC may also begin investigations without a citizen report, if it has concerns about any of Section 2’s market disruptions.
Enactment: This Act comes into force immediately after passage.
Sponsor: N/A
Type: Act of Parliament
A
BILL
TO
Establish Market Competition Laws
BILL
TO
Establish Market Competition Laws
1. Short Title
(a) This bill shall be referred to as the "Fair Competition Act".
(b) This bill was authored by Lysander Lyon.
2. Market Disruption
(a) Market Consolidation shall be defined as intentional consolidation of market share in a given market by an entity, in such manner as to restrict consumer choice and market competition, where the result either leads to immediately visible higher costs for the consumer or a significant restriction of choice, in an active market.
(i) For example, in an Azalea where there are three major diamond sellers (A, B, and C) selling at $4 per, $2.5 per, and $1.5 per respectively, Company A acquiring Company C would be problematic due to the expected price increase.
(ii) Similarly, even if Company A also priced its diamonds at $1.5, if Company A and Company C together would make up a vast majority (IE 80%) of the diamond market, this could also be problematic, assuming diamonds are frequently traded. If there are few diamond purchases in general, this would no longer hold as an issue.
(b) Market Manipulation shall be defined as the intentional and unnatural manipulation of market forces for the gain of oneself or others.
(i) For example, naturally increasing diamond sale prices due to demand is an acceptable response to market forces. Discussing with other diamond suppliers and agreeing to all raise diamond sale prices is not.
(c) Hostile Monopolization shall be defined as an entity’s monopolization or near-monopolization of a market or industry, which has resulted in measurably poor outcomes for participants in that market or industry.
(i) Monopolization refers to situations where an entity either is the sole supplier or demander of a specific good, or has amassed a vast majority of the market share.
(ii) This section specifically clarifies and applies to hostile monopolies; that is, monopolies that are causing market participants unnecessary harm. There being only one farming company because only a few people wish to farm, is not inherently hostile monopolization or market consolidation. If that farming company is dramatically overcharging, with high prices not related to demand, that would be hostile monopolization.
(iii) This does not apply to patents granted for international research.
3. Azalea Isles Trade Commission
(a) This bill establishes the Azalea Isles Trade Commission (AITC), which shall have its own Discord to operate out of.
(b) There shall be one Commissioner of the AITC, nominated by the Prime Minister and confirmed by Parliament. The Commissioner shall serve in their position indefinitely, until such time as they either resign or are removed through a majority vote of Parliament.
(c) The Commissioner shall be responsible for running the AITC, including hiring employees where needed, and submitting budget requests to the Ministry of State, to be forwarded to the Prime Minister and Parliament.
4. Competition Governance
(a) Actions of market disruption, as outlined in Section 2, may be reported to the AITC for evaluation.
(i) Individuals may request their name be kept fully anonymous, and the Commission must comply with this request if it is made.
(b) The AITC shall evaluate the report, and may request reasonable documentation from companies under investigation to come to its conclusion.
(i) This shall mandatorily include a response from the company or companies at some point in the case before a conclusion is reached, addressing the allegation. For example, if the report is over an acquisition being market consolidation, this response will allow the company/companies to explain why the acquisition is not large enough to be restricting choice, why the market is not active enough to warrant intervention, why it will not raise prices, etc.
(c) The AITC shall be empowered to levy fines, block acquisitions, reverse acquisitions, and negotiate contractual agreements in the course of preventing and enforcing against market disruptions. The Commission shall adhere to the following structure while doing so:
(i) For relatively minor cases, where harm is estimated to be fairly small (under $50,000), the Commission may handle the cases as it feels fit, with the exception of the requirement outlined in 4c(iv).
(ii) For moderate cases, where harm is estimated to be between $50,000 and $150,000, the Commission shall provide the Cabinet with a copy of its findings, and propose its solution. The proposed solution must pass a majority vote of the sitting Cabinet members.
(iii) For large cases, where harm is estimated to be greater than $150,000, the Commission shall provide Parliament with a copy of its findings, and its proposed solution. The solution must pass a majority vote of the sitting Members of Parliament.
(iv) All contracts, regardless of the size of the case, must receive approval by a majority vote of Parliament before they can be binding. The Commission may not sign or approve a contract without this majority approval, which shall be proposed for no shorter than 24 hours of debate and 24 hours of voting, subject to all other parliamentary procedure.
(v) Harm shall be estimated based on actual harm and reasonable potential harm to the consumer and the market, over a reasonable timeframe decided by the Commission that should be no shorter than three months and no longer than six. This decided timeframe must be reasonable, and the logic in deciding a timeframe should apply across reports, such that bias does not occur.
(d) The AITC may also begin investigations without a citizen report, if it has concerns about any of Section 2’s market disruptions.
Enactment: This Act comes into force immediately after passage.